In this paper we analyze the effect of European and national funding on innovation input and output at the firm level. In terms of innovation input, we do not find evidence that one policy crowds out the effect of the other. Instead, the policies are complements. In terms of output, we find that subsidy recipients are more active with respect to patenting. A citation analysis of patents reveals that the subsidy recipients file patents that are more valuable (in terms of forward citations) than those filed in the counterfactual situation of receiving no public support. These results suggest that public funding triggers socially beneficial research projects and that the co-existence of national and European policies does not lead to crowding-out effects when compared to a hypothetical world of a closed economy with no supplemental European policies.
Introduction
Even though the European Council stimulated R&D investments through its "Action Plan 2010" and through the renewed Lisbon Strategy on growth and job creation, Europe lags behind its main competitors in terms of investment in R&D. While the USA spends some 2.8 per cent of its GDP on R&D and Japan spends around 3.4 per cent, the EU spends a mere 1.8 per cent. It is still far behind the formerly foreseen target of 3 per cent for 2010 (OECD 2010) . To narrow this gap between the EU and some major economic players, the European Commission (EC) supplements national policies that aim at fostering investment in R&D and innovation. More concretely, the EC has adopted three main instruments to achieve the goals of the renewed Lisbon Strategy on growth and job creation, namely the Research Framework Programs (FPs), the Competitiveness and Innovation Program (CIP) and the Cohesion Policy. These programs consist in attributing financial support to firms. A key question is to know whether the current policy mix of EU and national subsidy measures constitute an efficient and effective way of supporting innovation and R&D in Member States. 1 A better understanding of the impact of policy measures adopted by various levels of government contributes to a more pragmatic assessment of what can realistically be expected of such policies, and how the effect might be impacted by the funding source. Griliches (1979) stipulated that "a dollar is a dollar irrespective of source (unless there are explicit expenditures and accounting rules connected with the use of federal money which may lead to inefficiencies)" (109/110). Indeed, it is largely acknowledged that in order to benefit from a subsidy, firms have to lobby, prepare R&D project proposals, comply to specific accounting standards and have to fulfill reporting duties. Therefore, benefiting from public subsides may entail both monetary and non-pecuniary application cost (see e.g. Capron and van Pottelsberghe 1997) , which in turn might impact innovation efficiency. As we will outline below, these application costs are heterogeneous across policy instruments. Therefore, this paper empirically explores whether policy programs have different effects with respect to innovation input and output in recipient firms by performing a treatment effects analysis. In particular, we consider subsidies from national policies and subsidies from EU policies as heterogeneous treatments. 2 We extend past studies by going beyond input additionality and also investigating output effects. To analyze output additionality, we employ an econometric matching procedure allowing us to hold the innovation input constant. This enables us to indirectly infer whether the firms' project management induced by monitoring and reporting duties within the subsidy schemes improves the innovation performance, all else being constant. Another novel aspect of our contribution is that we consider multiple innovation output indicators, such as sales with new products, patent applications as well as forward patent citations. This paper is the first to empirically distinguish and simultaneously analyze the effects of a national versus an EU policy mix on innovation input and output of firms. Our set-up also allows investigating whether national and EU policies are substitutes or complements. 1 For a discussion on the concept of "Policy Mix", refer to Flanagan, Uyarra, and Laranja (2011) , where the authors' reconceptualize the concept of policy mix in the context of innovation policy. They define the term policy mix as "Imported from economic policy debates, imply[ing] a focus on interactions and interdependencies between different policies as they affect the extent to which policy goals are realized." 2 The heterogeneous treatment effects estimation follows a methodology introduced by Gerfin and Lechner (2002) who investigated the effects of different labor market policies. In the context of innovation, Czarnitzki, Ebersberger, and Fier (2007) used this approach to explore whether R&D collaboration and subsidies are complementing each other or whether the firm level decision to collaborate on innovation project and the policy decision to subsidize certain projects should possibly be considered as substitutes. This argument has been brought forward theoretically by Hinloopen (2001) . The present paper uses the heterogeneous treatment framework to investigate whether national and EU innovation subsidy policies impact input and/or output additionality differently.
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We assess the impacts of innovation policies that were in place between 1992 and 2006 for a sample of German firms. Germany appears to be a very appropriate case for this study, as Germany is one of the few European countries that does not maintain policy schemes granting tax credits to R&D performers. It uses direct subsidies for R&D performers as a main policy tool. The estimated effects of direct subsidies are therefore less confounded with other policies in Germany than in other European countries. Our findings point to the conclusion that both, EU grants and national grants, as well as the combination of both, lead to higher innovation input in the economy. Hence, our empirical study does not suggest that either of these policies is subject to full crowding-out. In addition, we do not find evidence that one policy is crowding-out the effect of the other, as recipients that obtain funding from both sources invest on average more into innovation and R&D than in the counterfactual of just receiving funds from a single source. In terms of output additionality, we find that nationally subsidized firms (or firms financed form both sources) are more active patentees and that the filed patents are also of higher value. Finally, we do not find evidence for the superiority of one policy when compared with the other. When considering these results, one should keep in mind that they are not generalizable to overall national versus supra-national subsidy schemes but that they merely concern the comparison between German and EU innovation subsidy schemes. Likewise, while we can compare German national and EU supra-national schemes, with the data at hand we cannot draw any conclusions with respect the difference between the various EU support schemes.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 first reviews the literature and provides an overview of the policies under scrutiny. Section 3 describes the research design, the methodology and the data. Section 4 presents the empirical findings and Section 5 concludes.
Background

Brief Theoretical Background and Literature Review
Ample theoretical as well as empirical literature has shown that firms typically do not invest the amount of money in R&D and innovation that would be desirable from a social point of view. The economic rationale behind public intervention in terms of R&D and innovation is generally justified by the fact that in a freely competitive market, social returns to R&D and innovation are higher than private returns, mainly due to three reasons (Arrow 1962) . First, knowledge is a non-rival and non-exclusive good. As a consequence, firms are not able to appropriate all returns from their investment, even though they have to bear all of the costs. Second, R&D has an inherently uncertain character. R&D projects may fail, and even in the case of a successful completion of R&D projects, it is by no means certain that innovations based on new R&D outcomes are also successful in the market. Third, given the high risks and uncertainties involved in R&D projects, it might turn out to be difficult for a firm to find external lenders to finance its R&D activities (see Hall and Lerner, 2010 , for a survey of this strand of literature).
As the public provision of funds for corporate R&D, however, creates the danger of moral hazard, it has been of interest in the empirical economic literature for many years now whether policy initiatives are subject to crowding-out effects, that is, firms could simply substitute public for private funds instead of investing the received subsidies in addition to the privately available R&D budget. David, Hall, and Toole (2000) survey micro-and macroeconomic studies on the impact of public R&D subsidies on private R&D expenditure. 3 One major result of their survey is that in most studies reviewed, the selection of the funded firms into public funding programs had been largely ignored. More recent studies addressing the selection bias include Busom (2000) , Wallsten (2000) , Lach (2002) , Almus and Czarnitzki (2003) , Duguet (2004) , Gonzá lez, Jaumandreu, and Pazó (2005) , Czarnitzki, Ebersberger, and Fier (2007) , Aerts and Schmidt (2008) , Hussinger (2008) and Lopes-Bento (2012, 2013) . Among those studies, the ones analyzing subsidies in our country of interest, Germany, never found evidence of full crowding-out. In fact, in a survey by Hall and Maffioli (2008) on crowding-out effects, the authors conclude that in empirical literature since 2000, crowding-out was only found for the US Small Business Innovation Research program evaluated by Wallsten (2000) . Employing a sample of 479 observations and using a Three Stage Least Squares (3SLS) approach, the author finds dollar per dollar crowding-out of firm-financed R&D in his analysis. However, he does not exclude the possibility that the grants might have had a positive effect on keeping the funded firms' R&D activities constant, which might not have been possible otherwise. In the more recent empirical findings (including the one mentioned here above), authors did generally not find evidence of crowding-out effects (see also Cerulli 2010 , for a recent survey).
Studies differentiating between EU programs, like for instance Benfratello and Sembenelli (2002) , comparing the effect of support stemming from the EU's EUREKA program with support coming from the (3rd and 4th) FP, find a positive association of a EUREKA subsidy with regard to labor productivity and price cost margin. However, no clear pattern could be found for Framework support. In line with these findings, Barajas, Huergo, and Moreno (2012) do not find a significant difference in labor productivity between firms that did and did not participate in the FP between 1995 and 2005 (corresponding to FP4, FP5 and part of FP6). Similarly, Dekker and Kleinknecht (2008) did not find enhanced innovative output in terms of sales with market novelties per employee for firms participating in the EU FP in France, Germany and the Netherlands. Blanes and Busom (2004) analyze the heterogeneity of regional and national subsidy programs in Spain. They conclude that national and regional programs support different types of firms, and that each agency may be using R&D subsidies with a somewhat different policy goal in each industry. If such conclusions can be drawn within national borders of a country, it seems relevant to analyze potential heterogeneities in policy use and their effects on an international basis. Yet, surprisingly none of the previous studies differentiates between national and European subsidies. As a matter of fact, many did not even take into account that there might be funding from various sources.
As has been shown by some of the cited papers and will become clear in the following sub-section, criteria differ between funding agencies, or according to whether the subsidy is granted by a national government or by the EC. Not only do expectations of the suggested projects differ from a purely technical point of view, but administrative and bureaucratic requirements differ as well, forcing the beneficiaries to keep track of expenses, deliverables, work plans and timetables. On one hand, this might trigger administrative know-how, vital for the sound management of any successful project. Indeed, it has been shown in the literature that organizational competences can have an important impact on firms' performance (Teece 2010) . On the other hand, lengthy administrative procedures put an extra burden on firms, and might lead to inefficiencies (Griliches 1979 ).
The Policies Under Scrutiny
The current paper analyzes whether grants stemming from different funding agencies trigger heterogeneous effects. More precisely, we investigate if the effects differ depending on whether a grant stems from a national or a European entity. The following sub-sections will explain the main differences of the programs under scrutiny. 4 2.2.1 Subsidies by the German Government. The basic principle of direct subsidies for R&D and innovation in Germany consists of the fact that they are attributed as so-called "matched grants". In other words, the cost of the R&D project is shared between the applicant and the government. While the German government has several public support schemes for direct subsidies for R&D and innovation, the tool that is by far the most important one is the German Federal Government's mission-oriented R&D funding scheme called "Direkte Projektfö rderung" (DPF). Already in the past the most important policy tool in this domain, it continues to gain in importance because it is the main distribution channel for the new "High-Tech Strategy" launched by the Federal Government. The DPF is the most important policy measure in terms of the size of the grants as well as in terms of number of attributed grants (BMBF 2006) .
The DPF scheme not only offers grants for R&D projects in predefined fields of technology, like for instance biotechnology, sustainable development, information technology and materials research, but also covers technologies in the area of transport, health, energy, and others.
Along with the scientific value and the knowledge created and acquired, the primary objective of German public R&D funding is to make the most effective and efficient commercial use of R&D results. As a consequence, in its funding procedures, the German federal government encourages the grant recipients to "use" the results or technologies obtained thanks to the public support. "Using" research results can be done for instance by filing patents, licensing or commercialization of R&D. When a firm files a subsidy application, a plan for such a utilization of research results has to be included in the submission. All publicly funded firms are expected and encouraged to take responsibility for their commercialization management. In order to give an incentive to the grant recipients, the Federal Government allows firms to keep the research results secret and to benefit from all its returns for at least 2 years. However, if recipients do not apply for a patent or document another utilization within 2 years after completion of the research, the R&D results become public (BMBF 2000) .
As can be deduced from the above description, the receipt of a grant by the German government reflects in a certain way the quality of the recipient. A firm that does not have a convincing plan on how to use its research results is unlikely to be retained for public support.
2.2.2 Subsidies by the EC. Three main instruments have been developed by the EC to contribute to the competitiveness and the achievement of the goals of the renewed Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Jobs, namely the Research Framework Programs and the Cohesion Fund (Structural Funds). 5 These instruments have as a goal to complement each other in order for Europe to become a knowledge-based economy, "producing knowledge through research, diffusing it through education, and applying it through innovation" (Spring 2005, European Council).
The FPs, made public by calls for proposals, concern specific thematic priorities and are often more "soft skill" and basic research-oriented (hence often directed to universities or research centers). Existing since 1984, they have been put in place to coordinate dispersed R&D activities funded by the EC. Since then, seven editions of FPs have been launched. Evaluation and selection criteria are based on scientific excellence and relevant socioeconomic aspects and are carried out by independent experts in each technological area.
The European Cohesion Fund Policy is at the center of the effort to improve the competitiveness of the Union as a whole, and its weakest regions in particular. As a consequence, these funds are increasingly destined to depressed regions. 6 The Cohesion Policy has by far the largest budgets among the two policies. For the period 2007-2013, the total budget was about e 346 billion, where roughly e 80 billion are dedicated to innovation and enterprise support. As a matter of illustration, the 7th Framework program (FP7), running between 2007 and 2013, has a budget of e 19.2 billion.
Differences Between German National Policy and EU Policy.
The policies under review differ in their administration, objectives, and thus applicant as well as grant structures.
With respect to administration, the programs differ quite a bit: the German DPF is administered by the Federal Government's Ministry for Education and Research (BMBF). As the program is structured by technology fields, the ministry commissions 12 different organizations to implement the program (handling applications, organizing the peer review process and so forth). For example, the National Centre for Aeronautics and Space handles all proposals in its respective field. The field of engineering is handled by the German Association of Engineers, and so forth. As mentioned above, the objectives of the program clearly focus on high-tech areas and aim at advancing the technological frontier in these domains. 5 A third policy instrument, the CIP, has been developed in order to achieve the Lisbon goals. Given that this policy concerns the period 2007 -2013, and hence not the period under review in this paper, we refrain from providing further details on the CIP. 6 In total, the intervention areas of the structural funds consist of 10 main categories, namely (1) innovation, (2) research and development (R&D), (3) business support, (4) information and communication technologies (ICT), (5) environment, (6) energy, (7) transport,(8) urban and rural development, (9) tourism and culture, and (10) education and social. The categorization stems from the European Union, Directorate-General for Regional Policy, 2010. In this study we focus on the two first categories, innovation and R&D.
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In contrast, the Cohesion Policy is a very broad program, jointly implemented by the EC and the Member States. While the German DPF covers all geographic areas of Germany and is purely meant for research and innovation, the Cohesion Policy is a more general policy meant for supporting depressed regions, and only a part of it is dedicated toward innovation. The Member States and the EC negotiate on how much budget is spent in each Member State and then regions can apply with their Federal government to be elected as an eligible area. The program implementation is managed by the regional governments, the "Lä nder". In order to apply for European funds within the Cohesion Policy, eligible candidates apply with their local governments rather than the EU or the German Federal Government. Although the innovation part of the program also focuses on enterprise support for technological development, the emphasis of the policy instrument can be different in each region as the regions apply with a "business plan" to the Federal Government to become a supported region of Cohesion Policy. Thus, depending on the economic situation of the region, the emphasis in the funding structure may differ. As the focus is on depressed regions, however, most support for innovation focuses on smaller projects and technology adoption rather than on high-tech research raising the technological frontier. 7 Czarnitzki, Lopes-Bento, and Doherr (2011) calculated that the average grant size is about e 189,000 in the Cohesion Policy program. This figure, however, might be misleading as the grant structure is highly skewed. The median grant size is only e 7,200 and the 1st quartile of the grant distribution takes a value of e 2,318 and the 3rd quartile is at e 59,416. 8 These are clearly smaller projects than those granted within the German DPF program, which typically are projects that last about 3.5 -4 years. In the 2000's, the 1st quartile, median and 3rd quartile of the grant distribution are e104,724, e 225,511 and e 457,340, respectively (authors' own calculation using the PROFI database).
In contrast to Cohesion Policy, the Framework Policy programs are solely administered by the EC and clearly focus on scientific excellence of the proposed research projects. Unlike the German DPF, however, the European FPs emphasize to a much greater extent overall basic research activities and networking and training rather than focusing on specific technological developments in target fields. Financed proposals usually last between 3 and 5 years, and in 2009, for example, the average grant size amounted to about e 710,000. 9 Similarly to the other policies, these subsidies are also based on matched grants.
In summary, the German DPF clearly focuses on high-tech funding, whereas the European programs are targeted either at firms in depressed regions with less ambitious goals (Cohesion Policy) or at (international) knowledge spillovers and improvement of 7 This statement is based on a qualitative assessment by the authors after reading the list of granted projects within Cohesion Policy programs in Germany since 2007. See Czarnitzki, Ebersberger, and Fier (2007) for a description on how to access the Cohesion Policy recipient data. 8 These figures are based on all thematic areas as it was impossible to isolate "innovation projects" in the database.
We thus make the implicit assumption that the grant structure in Cohesion Policy is similar across the 10 different themes. 9 Note that this average figure is not necessarily comparable to the figures mentioned for the DPF and Cohesion Policy grants. The latter are grants to an individual recipient even if the project proposal was filed by a consortium of organization. The figure for the FP, however, refers to the volume of the entire project proposals typically filed by consortia. We were not able to find detailed data on consortia size so that we cannot tell how large the average grant to an individual recipient is. human capital through training, conferences, symposia and alike (FPs). It could thus be the case that the funding source matters for the outcome of a project. Both Cohesion Policy and DPF might stimulate technological developments, and thus have a significant impact on innovation input and output. In addition, however, the DPF may be more likely to push the technological frontier as the projects are on average larger and more ambitious than in the Cohesion Policy. In contrast, the FPs target much more at networking and spillovers so that one could also expect a direct effect on innovation investment from the FPs, but the immediate effect on innovation outcomes in the recipient firms might be smaller than in the German DPF, for instance.
Research Design, Methodology and Data
Research Design
In line with the literature, we investigate how different firm characteristics affect companies' participation in public funding schemes, and how this, in turn, affects R&D input and innovation performance. We distinguish four groups of firms: (i) firms that get no subsidies, (ii) firms that get only EU funding, (iii) firms that get only funding from national sources and (iv) firms that get funding from both sources.
Following the methodology by Gerfin and Lechner (2002) allowing for multiple treatments, we consider the receipt of a national subsidy, a European subsidy and both sources as heterogeneous "treatments" in the subsequent analyses. Czarnitzki, Ebersberger, and Fier (2007) have used the same methodology for a multiple treatment effects study on subsidies and R&D collaborations in Germany and Finland, where the heterogeneity of the treatment consisted in receiving a subsidy, collaborating on R&D projects, having both these treatments (i.e. being a subsidized and collaborating firm) or having neither one of these treatments (i.e. relying merely on in-house R&D and private funds only). This allows disentangling the effects due to national funding, to European funding and to funding of both these sources. Given our possible combinations of treatments, we can distinguish between the cases of public funding shown in Table 1 . First, innovation input is analyzed, that is, we use total innovation intensity as well as R&D intensity as dependent variables, and second, we are interested in knowing what the effect of (the combination of) subsidies is on innovation performance. More precisely, we estimate whether a treatment leads to higher sales of products new to the market, or to increased patenting activity in the recipient firms. In this second part of the study, we keep the innovation input constant, that is, we match on the joint probabilities of receiving either one of the treatments and on innovation input. 10 This allows testing two hypotheses: on the one hand, we can test whether publicly funded firms achieve the same innovation performance as in the counterfactual situation of not being funded. If that would not be the case, we could conclude that the subsidized projects are actually of lower "quality" or less productive or of riskier nature than projects that are conducted from privately financed resources. On the other hand, we can also test whether a certain type of subsidy (EU versus national) yields higher performance with the same total innovation budget at the firm level. This could hint at differences in selection criteria of the agencies and more successful project management possibly triggered through reporting or administrative requirements induced by the funding authorities. For both exercises, the cases presented in Table 1 are investigated. The cases in italic, namely cases 6, 8 and 9, could not be estimated due to data limitations (see Section 4 below for more details on the methodology and data).
Suppose that there are M different states of treatments and the receipt of one particular treatment m is indicated by the variable S [ f0; 1; . . . ; M}. The average treatment effect of a firm receiving m relative to a firm receiving l can be written as:
where Y m and Y l denote the outcomes of the different states. Our different treatment categories can take the following different m "values": no public funding, only national funding, only EU funding, both types of funding. Each of those possible cases involves an estimate of a counterfactual situation, as for firms receiving treatment (meaning firms in m), we can only observe the actual value of the outcome. However, we cannot observe the outcome variable in the counterfactual situation l.
Econometric Approach
The econometric methodology follows Gerfin and Lechner (2002) and is based on nearest neighbor matching. Even though the econometrics of evaluation literature suggests a series of different estimation strategies to correct for selection bias (see Heckman, Lalonde, and Smith 1999; Imbens and Wooldridge 2009, for surveys) including the difference-indifference estimator, control function approaches (selection models) and instrumental variable (IV) estimation, with the data at hand for this study (to be described in the next section), non-parametric matching estimation is the most adequate approach. Compared to IV and selection models, it has the advantage that we neither have to assume any functional form for the outcome equation nor is a distributional assumption on the error terms of the selection equation and the outcome equation necessary. The disadvantage is that it only controls for the selection on observables, that is, the Conditional Independence Assumption has to hold (Rubin 2008) . 11 Put differently, we have to assume that all the relevant characteristics driving the selection into a funding program are observed. The nearest neighbors are selected based on propensity scores of receiving a certain treatment, that is, for each treated firm in status m, we search for a firm in status l that had the same probability to receive m but did not actually get it. Suppose the choice probability of the alternative j conditional on X is PðS ¼ jjX ¼ x Þ ¼ P j ðx Þ and we want to calculate the effect of treatment m compared with l on the firms in m. Following Gerfin and Lechner (2002) , the treatment effect can be calculated by
where the first term is replaced by the mean value of the outcome variable of the treated firms in state m, and the second term, the counterfactual situation, is replaced by the mean of the selected control group in state l. The average treatment effect is estimated by the mean difference in the outcome of the matched pairs.
The matching protocol is summarized in Table 2 and follows Gerfin and Lechner (2002) . In order to obtain the propensity score for our matching routine, we estimate a seemingly unrelated probit model (also called bivariate dichotomous probit model) on the probability of receiving national funding and European funding. Based on the probit model estimates, we calculate for each case as described in Table 1 the joint probabilities that a firm received a certain combination of treatments. For instance, for case 1, we calculate the joint probability that a firm got national funding but not EU funding, that is, P ("national funding" ¼ 1, "EU funding ¼ 0jX) and search for the nearest neighbor in the group of firms that actually did not get any funding but show the same propensity to get national funding but not EU funding. This is done analogously for all cases described in Table 1 . 12 Note that we always require the observations on firms in the selected control group l to belong to the same industry and the same region (Eastern versus Western Germany) and be observed in the same year as the firms in the treatment group m. 11 See Smith and Todd (2005) , for a overview on the different types of matching variants or Rosenbaum (2001) , and
Imbens (2004), for more general surveys on the estimation of treatment effects. 12 In some cases, we apply a variant of the nearest neighbour matching. As we will describe in the empirical part, the closest nearest neighbor was sometimes not very similar to the treated firm in question, which occasionally led to a situation where the two samples of treated and control observations were not accurately balanced in covariates after the matching routine. We therefore used caliper matching introduced by Cochran and Rubin (1973) for those cases. The intuition of caliper matching is to avoid "bad" matches (those for which the value of the matching argument X j is far from X i ) by imposing a threshold of the maximum distance allowed between the treated and the control group. That is, a match for firm i is only chosen if kX j 2 X i k , 1, where 1 is a pre-specified tolerance. In addition, it sometimes happened that the covariates were not balanced to a satisfactory extent even after introducing a caliper restriction. In these cases we switched to "hybrid matching" (see e.g. Lechner 1998), i.e. we introduced those covariates as matching arguments in addition to the propensity score. Then we calculated the Mahalanobis distance to obtain a onedimensional measure for the similarity of control observations, as outlined in Table 2 .
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3.3 Data Source, Variables and Descriptive Statistics 3.3.1 Data Sources. The data used in this paper stem from the Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP), which is the German part of the Community Innovation Survey. In this study, we use data from several waves of the MIP that contain a question on the receipt of innovation subsidies from the national government and the EU, respectively. Most questions of the MIP are asked such that the survey covers a 3-year period. For instance, the MIP1995 asks for innovation activities in the period of 1992-1994. A firm would be asked whether it introduced a new product within this 3-year period. In particular, we use the following MIP waves: MIP1995 (covering the years 1992-1994), MIP1999 (covering the years 1996- Our sample concerns only innovative firms and covers manufacturing as well as business-related services sectors. According to the Oslo Manual, an innovation is defined as the implementation of a new or significantly improved product (good or service), or process, a new marketing method, or a new organizational method in business practices, workplace Step 1 Specify and estimate a probit model to obtain the joint probabilities for all combinations of treatments.
Step 2 Restrict the sample to common support for the cases (1-12, see Table 1 ) in question: delete all observations on treated firms with probabilities larger than the maximum and smaller than the minimum in the potential control group. (This step is also performed for other covariates that are possibly used in addition to the propensity score as matching arguments.)
Step 3 Estimate the counterfactual expectations of the outcome variables. For a given value of m and l, the following steps are performed:
(a) Choose one observation from the subsample of treated firms and delete it from that pool.
(b) Find an observation in the sub-sample of participants in l that is as close as possible to the one chosen in step (a) in terms of the propensity score. Closeness is based on the Mahalanobis distance between this firm and all non-subsidized firms in order to find the most similar control observation.
is the empirical covariance matrix of the matching arguments based on the sample of potential controls. Do not remove the selected controls from the pool of potential controls so that it can be used again.
In some cases we also use an additional caliper restriction to avoid bad matches (see Cochran and Rubin 1973) . If the set of potential controls was empty after applying the restriction, the treated observation in question was deleted from the sample in this respective case. (d) Using the matched comparison group formed in (c), compute the respective conditional expectation by the sample mean. Note that the same observation may appear more than once in that group.
Step 4 Repeat step 3 for all combinations of m and l.
Step 5 Compute the estimate of the treatment effects using the results of step 4.
Step 6 To estimate the counterfactual situation, we perform sampling with replacement. An ordinary t-statistic on mean differences would thus be biased because it does not take the appearance of repeated observations into account. Therefore, to be able to draw conclusions on statistical inference, we have to correct the standard errors. We follow Lechner (2001) and calculate his estimator for an asymptotic approximation of the standard errors. organization or external relations (see Eurostat and OECD 2005) . Our innovation definition focuses on technological innovation, as mere organizational and marketing innovation projects are usually not subsidized by governments. Thus, an innovator in this study is a firm that either has introduced at least one new or significantly improved product, has introduced a new production process or has attempted to technologically innovate, that is, the firm may have either abandoned an innovation project or has at least one ongoing innovation project. Table A1 shows the industry structure of our sample. In total, the sample consists of 8,734 observations, out of which 6,272 observations did not receive any public funding, 1,535 received exclusively national funding, 140 received exclusively EU funding and 787 received funding from both financial sources.
Unfortunately, we can use the data only as pooled cross sections and not as panel. The 8,734 observations correspond to 6,106 different firms, and 73 per cent of the firms are only observed once in our sample. Thus, panel econometric approaches, such as the differencein-difference estimator, are ruled out as we would lose the lion's share of our sample.
Dependent Variables.
In the first part of this paper, the main question of the analysis is whether firms' innovative activities are stimulated by public innovation subsidies, and by the type of funding they are receiving. Treatments are indicated by two dummy variables: PFEU indicates that the firm is a recipient of a European grant and PFNAT indicates a beneficiary of a national grant. Of the full sample, 28.2 per cent of the firms receive some kind of public support. Out of these beneficiaries, 5.7 per cent receive only European grants, 62.3 per cent receive only national grants and 32 per cent receive both.
As measures of innovation input that might be affected by the different policies, we use two variables: (i) R&D activity is measured as R&D intensity, RD_INT, being the ratio of internal R&D expenditures to sales (multiplied by 100) and (ii) total innovation intensity, INNOV_INT, which is the ratio of total innovation expenditure to sales (multiplied by 100). 13 In the second part of this paper, we are interested in knowing to which extent innovation performance varies according to whether or not firms receive subsidies, and the kind of subsidy received. We measure innovation performance by three different variables. First, we employ a patent dummy indicating whether firm i files at least one patent in year t þ 1 (PAT_LEAD_D). Second, the share of sales with products new to the firms' market is used. In the MIP survey, firms are asked to indicate what percentage of their total sales is due to products introduced in the period under review that were entirely new for the respective firm's main product market. The variable is measured as per cent of market novelty sales in total sales (NOV_SALES). Finally, we are interested in knowing whether patents got filed 13 Internal R&D expenditures are defined as the expenditures that pertain to "Research and experimental development (R&D) comprising creative work undertaken on a systematic basis in order to increase the stock of knowledge, including knowledge of man, culture and society, and the use of this stock of knowledge to devise new applications" (OECD 2002, 30 Frascati Manual, Section 2.1). A detailed breakdown of the balance sheet categories that are part of internal R&D expenditures can be found in the Frascati Manual, Section 6.2., page 108. Total innovation expenditure is defined according to the Oslo Manual (see OECD/Eurostat 2005, 91, chapter 2) and comprises internal and external R&D spending, the purchase of machinery and software for innovation projects, purchase of other external knowledge such as patents, licenses and similar intellectual property rights, prototyping and similar preparations for production and market introduction, marketing activities in direct relation with a new product introduction as well as cost for training of employees directly linked to innovation projects.
Innovation Subsidies 391 because of the high quality of the invention and the desire of the inventor to protect it, or because this was a requirement of the funding agency. While the one does not exclude or undermine the other, given that the funding agency requires the subsidy recipients to "use" their inventions, it is a priori not clear if the fact of patenting an invention is because of its quality or to satisfy the agency requirements. As a consequence, we evaluate the difference in the average citation per patent (forward citations) between the treated and the control group (AV_CIT_PAT), indicating whether an invention is considered as relevant prior art for future inventions. 14 3.3.3 Control Variables. We use several control variables in our analysis that might have an impact on whether a firm receives a subsidy and the origin of the latter as well as on the outcome variables mentioned above. Firm size is measured in terms of employment. As the firm size distribution is skewed, the variable enters in logarithms (ln EMP). We also allow for a potential non-linear relationship by including (ln EMP) 2 . The log of the firm's age (ln AGE) is included in the analysis as it is often claimed that older firms are more reluctant to pursue innovation. In addition, the government maintains special policy schemes for startup companies which make the receipt of funding possibly more likely for younger firms.
Further, we include a dummy variable capturing whether a firm is part of a group (GP) such as a multinational company or a holding company for instance, and if so, whether or not its headquarters are on national or foreign territory (FOREIGN). The likelihood that firms belonging to a group with the parent company on national territory receive a national subsidy is presumably higher, given that those might be better informed about public subsidy schemes because of network linkages and hence more inclined to apply for them. On similar grounds, national governments might favor firms that are part of a group in their decisionmaking process when choosing beneficiaries because the latter are more likely to benefit from potential spillover effects and specialized know-how from their parents. Similarly, firms belonging to groups with a foreign parent company might be more likely to file applications in their home country or at the EU level. In addition, governments typically maintain special policy instruments for small-sized and medium-sized firms. If a small firm is however majority-owned by a large parent company, it would no longer qualify for most SMEprograms and hence the likelihood to receive a subsidy, at least at the national level, is reduced. The dummies GP and FOREIGN thus also control for this type of company profile, and, ex-ante, it is unclear whether one should expect a positive or a negative effect because of the two opposing arguments outlined above.
Furthermore, we also account for capital intensity. As capital-intensive production might rely more heavily on innovation activities than labor-intensive firms, they might also be more likely to apply for subsidies. In contrast, high capital intensity might also reflect higher barriers of entry, and thus such firms might innovate less and therefore apply less for subsidies. The variable is measured as fixed assets relative to employment (CAPINT ¼ fixed assets/EMP). Previous experience in successful R&D activities plays a vital role when applying for public support, as governments often adopt a picking-the-winner strategy and hence might favor firms with previous success stories. Therefore, we include the patent stock (PS) in our regression. The patent stock enters into the regression as patent stock per employee to avoid potential multicollinearity with firm size (PS/EMP). Even though "not all inventions are patentable" and "not all inventions are patented" (Griliches 1990, 10) , the patent stock is the best approximation we have for past innovation activities as data on previous R&D expenditures are not available. The patent data stem from the German Patent and Trademark Office. The firm-level patent stocks are computed as a time series of patent applications with a 15 per cent rate of obsolescence of knowledge capital, as is common in the literature (see e.g. Jaffe 1986; Hall 1990; Griliches and Mairesse 1984) :
In addition to past successful innovation, the current innovation potential clearly depends on the firm's current ability to engage in R&D activities. This, as well as administrative knowhow, is controlled for by a dummy taking the value of 1 if a firm has an internal R&D department (RDLAB).
Furthermore, we include the export intensity (EXPORT ¼ sales abroad/total sales) to measure the degree of international competition a firm faces. Firms that are active in foreign markets may be more innovative than the ones serving only nationally and possibly more likely to apply for subsidies.
We also account for the price-cost margin. We approximate it empirically as introduced by Collins and Preston (1969) and Ravenscraft (1983) [PCM ¼ (sales 2 staff cost 2 material costs)/sales]. PCM accounts for the availability of internal funds. It has been pointed out in the literature that the major financial resource for innovation projects are internal funds, as firms might suffer from financial constraints in the private credit market. Potential lenders may be less willing to finance R&D when compared to investments into fixed assets because of the higher uncertainty of returns and lower inside collateral values as R&D is immediately sunk when expensed (see e.g. Hall and Lerner 2010, for a recent survey of this strand of literature).
Finally, we also include a dummy variable taking on the value of 1 if a firm is based in the Eastern part of Germany (EAST). Eastern German firms benefit from special conditions in terms of public support since Eastern Germany is subject to the transformation from a planned economy to a market economy after the German re-unification in 1990. Last but not least, industry dummies control for unobserved heterogeneity across sectors (see Table A1 for the definition of industries) and time dummies capture macroeconomic shocks.
As there are missing values in some of the variables, we created dummy variables equal to 1 if the values were missing and impute a zero for the missing values in the original data. Including a dummy in the regressions captures the bias arising from this transformation in the estimated slopes of the concerned variables. This technique has been used to account for missing values in the capital intensity variable (D(CAPINT ¼ missing)) and the PCM variable (D(PCM ¼ missing)).
3.3.4 Timing of Variables. As mentioned above, each wave of the survey covers a 3-year period. In order to avoid endogeneity between the dependent variables and the covariates to Innovation Subsidies 393 the largest extent, we employ lagged values wherever possible. For instance, suppose the dependent variables are measured in period t. Then ln EMP, CAPINT, PS/EMP, PCM and EXPORT are measured at the beginning of the survey period, that is, in t 2 2.
The information on RDLAB, GP and FOREIGN is only available such that the question covers the whole 3-year period, that is t 2 2 to t. For instance, "Did your firm maintain an own, internal R&D department during 1996-1998?" We consider AGE as truly exogenous; hence, it is measured in period t and the variable EAST is time-invariant. Table 3 displays the mean values for all variables for all the envisaged cases of our analysis. In other words, we compare the mean values of unsubsidized firms with the mean values of EU-funded firms, of nationally funded firms and of firms that are funded by both funding sources. Furthermore, we compare the means of firms that get exclusively EU funds with firms that get exclusively national funds. As can be seen in Table 3 , all of our groups differ significantly among each other in the dependent variables as well as in the covariates. For instance, firms receiving subsidies from both funding sources are on average larger, have more patents per employee, are more likely to have an internal R&D laboratory, are younger, more export-oriented and are more likely to be associated with a group than firms that do not get any subsidies.
Descriptive Statistics.
These differences are also present when comparing non-subsidized firms with firms that get subsidies only from one funding source (with the exception of age with regard to firms that get only EU funding). When comparing characteristics of firms that get only national funding with firms that get only EU funding, we see that the latter type of firms tend to be larger, belonging to a group more often with a foreign parent company and are more export-oriented than the former. They further tend to be older.
Some results of the descriptive statistics suggest that public agencies seem to follow a picking-the-winner strategy, as subsidized firms have more experience in innovation activities and have more capacities and capabilities (as approximated by the variables patent stock, firm size and the indicator on having an own internal R&D department).
The outcome variables, namely internal R&D intensity and total innovation expenditure, differ significantly between all the cases under review. Compared to unsubsidized groups, the subsidized groups always have higher R&D and innovation intensity. This also holds for the innovation performance measures that will be used as outcome variables in the second part of the study (with the exception of market novelties in the case of unsubsidized versus on EU subsidies (I versus IV) and only national versus only EU funds (III versus IV)). Subsidized firms, irrespectively of the source, are also more likely to file patents in the future, and their patents have more forward citations, on average. At this point, however, it is not clear how much of these differences can be attributed to the financial support provided by the subsidy and how much to firm characteristics. The econometric analysis will reveal to what extent these differences can be attributed to the different treatments. On first sight, one can conclude from the probit estimates that basically the same variables are significant in both equations and thus that the European and national agencies have very similar selection criteria. Having a closer look at the magnitude of the coefficients, or more precisely, the differences in magnitudes of the coefficients across equations, we however find indications for different selection behaviors. For instance, the coefficients of the patent stock per employee differ significantly among equations (Wald test: x 2 (1) ¼ 11.40, p-value , 0.01), that is, the national funding agencies react more sensitively to prior innovation experience than European authorities when selecting recipients. Similarly, the PCM is more important for national funding than for EU funding (x 2 (1) ¼ 7.99, p-value , 0.01). Thus, national agencies seem to pay more attention to the R&D capabilities and private financial resources than the European agencies. We do not find significant differences in any other coefficients across equations except for EAST (x 2 (1) ¼ 93.29, p-value , 0.01), which possibly reflects special national efforts to foster the transformation process in Eastern Germany. Finally, note that the marginal effects of firm size, ln EMP and its squared term, differ somewhat between national and EU funding. The estimated curves describe a U-shaped relationship between the subsidy receipt and firm size. Plotting the estimated probabilities depending on firm size shows that both curves exhibit quite a similar shape until the firm size reaches about 150 employees. Then, however, the EU curve has a steeper slope indicating that firm size after a certain threshold becomes more important for EU funding than for national funding. 15 As expected, the correlation coefficient r is significantly different from zero, that is, if an external shock were to augment the probability of getting national subsidies, it would also have an effect on European subsidies. As r is positive, a positive shock in the probability of getting a national subsidy would also translate into a positive shock on the likelihood of EU grant receipts. As explained in the previous section, a necessary precondition for the matching estimator to be applicable is sufficient common support, meaning sufficient overlap between the propensity scores. In the methodology of Gerfin and Lechner (2002) , it is natural that for some cases under review (see Table 1 ), many treated observations have to be dropped, as one searches for controls in sometimes relatively small samples. Confer, for instance, case 1 in Table 1 . There we have a sample of 1,535 treated observations, and we would search in a potential control group of 6,272 observations. We would thus expect that we lose only a few treated observations because of the common support restriction. In contrast, the cases 6, 8 and 9 would require searching 787, 6,272 and 1,535 observations in a potential control group of only 140 observations (firms that got only EU funding). As this obviously appears to result in poor matches, these cases cannot be evaluated with our data, and are thus not considered for any further analysis. For the remaining cases, Table A4 lists the size of the treated groups and their respective control groups, as well as the number of treated observations dropped because of the common support restriction. As we mentioned earlier, in some cases, we included a caliper restriction to avoid bad matches. We also indicate in Table 4 how many treated observations have been dropped because of this restriction for each case.
In order to assess the success of the matching routine as outlined before, we reestimate a probit model on the respective treatment indicator defined for each case using the matched pairs. If the matching has been successful, one would expect that a test on overall model significance would not reject the null hypothesis that all coefficients in the regression of the treatment indicator on all the covariates are jointly zero. Table A2 reports the overall significance of our probit models after the matching for all considered cases. As the test statistics point out, the treatment group and the selected control group are all well balanced in the covariates after the matching for all cases considered here. 15 The non-linear relationship between firm size and the subsidy receipt could be explained by two factors. First, larger firms are typically more likely to receive subsidies as they, on the one hand, are more likely to apply, or apply in a more systematic manner than smaller firms, as they might have a more organized innovation process in the firm. On the other hand, they might have a higher grant probability for certain projects that require a large knowledge base and high innovation capacities and capabilities that only large firms might be able to maintain. Second, the fact that very small firms are more likely to receive subsidies than e.g. medium-sized firms might be due to the fact that several subschemes are aimed at start-ups or young, innovative companies. It is actually plausible that such effects are at work here, as the curves described by firm size reach their minima at a firm size of about 20-25 employees in the Probit regressions.
Innovation Subsidies 397 respectively. Standard errors are obtained with Lechner's (1999) asymptotic approximation correcting for replicated observations due to sampling with replacement. Cases 10 and 11 were matched using a caliper threshold to avoid bad matches and in addition for case 11 ln AGE and ln EMP were used as additional matching criteria in order to properly balance treatment group and control group.
Subsidy Effect on R&D and Innovation Intensity
It can be seen in cases 1-3 that getting subsidies (be it from national sources, from EU sources or from both sources cumulated) has a positive effect on R&D and innovation intensity of the recipient firms compared with not getting subsidies at all. For all three cases, the outcome variables are significant at a 1 per cent level, and the null hypothesis of full crowding-out can hence be rejected.
Cases 7 and 10 consider the opposite case, that is, a "treatment on the untreated". These two cases ask the question whether non-subsidized firms would have benefited from a treatment if they had gotten a subsidy from either national sources or both national and European sources. Here, we find significant negative results, that is, non-funded firms would have indeed invested more into R&D and innovation if they had gotten public support.
While the above-mentioned results are in line with most of the literature discussed in Section 2, we now turn to the more interesting and not yet investigated cases so far, that is, the different impacts of heterogeneous treatments within beneficiaries of different policies. The cases 4 and 5, for instance, benchmark the impact of EU policies compared with national policies. While we do not find any significant differences in the effect between receiving funds from the EU and funds from the German government (i.e. the recipient would have invested similarly if he would have received money from the German government rather than from the EC; case 4), we find that when national subsidies are combined with EU money, the recipients invest more than in the counterfactual situation of only getting a national subsidy. The latter finding (i.e. the significant result of case 5) rejects the hypothesis of crowding-out effect between different funding sources. Recipients of grants from both sources invest more compared to the counterfactual situation of getting funding only from the national authorities.
Accordingly, we also find significant treatment effects in cases 11 and 12 where we investigate whether single source recipients would have potentially benefited from a further treatment. We find that firms that got funding from only one source would have benefited from supplemental funding of the other source. This reinforces our conclusion that we can reject crowding-out between the funding schemes.
Acknowledging that public subsidies have an enhancing effect on R&D and innovation expenditures, comparing the origin of funding allows us to conclude that getting subsidies from both sources combined has the highest effect on R&D and innovation intensity. Intuitively, this could be expected, as adding together multiple grants results in higher resources for innovative activities. What was however much less clear a priori was to know whether subsidies originating from European funds or subsidies originating from national funds have a higher effect on R&D and innovation investment, respectively, if we would witness crowding-out effects between the various funding schemes.
Subsidy Effect on Innovation Performance
We now turn to the second part of our research questions, where innovation performance is considered. Table 6 presents the matching results for our sample on innovation performance proxied by sales with market novelties. We further use a dummy variable on Innovation Subsidies 399 future patent applications as an outcome variable, indicating whether firm i will file at least one patent in year t þ 1 as well as forward citations per patent. 17 respectively. Standard errors are obtained with Lechner's (1999) asymptotic approximation correcting for replicated observations due to sampling with replacement. Except for cases 2, 3, 4 and 12, a caliper threshold was used to avoid bad matches. For cases 7 and 11, ln EMP (RDLAB for case 10) were used as additional matching criteria in order to properly balance treatment group and control group.
17 Table A5 summarizes again how many observations are lost because of the common support condition and the calliper threshold. Note that the numbers of the initial sample sizes differ here as we lose some observations because of missing values in the outcome variables considered in this exercise. We do not just pick one control observation for each treated firm in this setting, but we allow for two controls for each treated firm. The success of the matching routine is outlined in Table A3 .
At this stage, it is vital to underline that to conduct this estimation we do not only match on the propensity score as we did in the previous sub-section, but we also include innovation input, that is, total innovation intensity which includes R&D expenditure, as a matching criterion. This is done in order to hold total innovation expenditures constant between the firms in state m and the firms in state l. In other words, even if firms get funding from two sources, the firms in the counterfactual group will be chosen such that their total innovation investment is basically the same as the one of the firms in the actual state. The only difference between both groups is hence the criteria they had to fulfill to obtain the one, the other or both grants. As a consequence this allows us to evaluate whether the selection criteria of the funding agencies are such that for a given amount of money invested in innovation projects, the chosen candidates show superior results. If this is the case, one could conclude that those firms have indeed the better R&D projects as well as the means and experience to successfully accomplish them. Table 6 , the analysis of sales with market novelties does not deliver clear conclusions, as we do not find a consistent pattern of effects across the cases. For instance, we do not find that firms receiving subsidies compared with the counterfactual of not getting a subsidy (cases 1, 2 and 3) achieve a higher output with market novelties. To some extent this may not be surprising as we hold the innovation input constant in this analysis. This also points to the conclusion, however, that firms funded by either source do not achieve lower product sales when compared to a counterfactual outcome of no or other treatments. In other words, in line with previous studies, we can conclude that public money is as productive as private money. 18 It, however, also means that on the one hand, we do not find clear evidence that firms would introduce more successful products with the same innovation budgets when their innovation process is guided by certain criteria that have to be respected when public money is received, e.g. systematic accounting of expenses, which might increase the process efficiency within organization, systematic reporting duties, which might influence the project management positively or may increase the focus of the corresponding innovation efforts and so forth. On the other hand, neither do we find evidence that explicit expenditure and accounting rules connected with the use of federal money leads to inefficiencies.
Results on Sales with Market Novelties. As one can see in
It has to be born in mind though that, at least in part, this lack of clear pattern might be due to some data limitations, as our information at hand may not allow identifying long-term innovation success because of the cross-sectional nature of our data. It could be the case that the innovation performance in terms of sales only evolves after longer time lags, which we cannot take into account with the given data. Hence, the rather short time lag we have between the receipt of a subsidy and the materialization of a new product might not be sufficient to grasp this effect of the latter to its full extent.
4.2.2
Results on Patent Activity. Given the data limitation pointed out above, we consider an alternative measure of innovation outcome, that is, the patent variable. This has two advantages: (i) as the patent data were collected separately, we can use a lead as dependent variable; and (ii) patenting activity can be assumed to be related much more closely in time to the actual research project than the introduction of new products. Therefore, the patent-lead dummy resolves some data limitations encountered with the new product introductions.
When considering the dummy variable on future patenting, we find that funded firms (from national, EU and both sources) will patent more in year t þ 1 than in the counterfactual situation with no public support (cases 1, 2 and 3) . Similarly, we also find that non-recipients would benefit from a national (or combined) subsidy receipt with regard to future patent applications (cf. cases 7, 10 and 11). Given that these results are obtained for the same innovation expenditures, this leads to the conclusion that publicly supported projects are not less productive than privately funded projects. To the contrary, we find that if no support would have been received, few patents would be filed in period t þ 1. In line with our previous findings, we do not find any superiority in our outcome variables when comparing EU with national funding (case 4). We can thus conclude that, also in terms of patenting, the project repartition between the two funding sources seems to be efficient for a given amount of money invested.
This finding also suggests that recipients of German national grants follow the subsidy guideline: in the major German policy schemes, e.g. the mission-orientated innovation funding, firms are encouraged to use their research results by filing patent application, for instance. If firms are encouraged to apply for patents due to a grant receipt, and we actually find here that this is the case, we can indirectly conclude that the government picked firms that were technologically capable enough to generate patentable inventions as desired by policy makers. Nonetheless, we were interested in knowing whether our results on patenting mainly reflected compliance with the rules or whether the patents concerned superior technological developments.
In order to investigate this phenomenon, we collected the number of forward citations per patent, that is, the number of future applications referring to the patent in question as relevant prior art. Forward citations are typically interpreted as proxy for the "importance", the "quality" or the "significance" of a patented invention. Previous studies have shown that forward citations are correlated with the social value (e.g. Trajtenberg 1990 ) and the private value of the patented invention (Harhoff et al. 1999; Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg 2005) . Furthermore, forward citations reflect the economic and technological "importance" as perceived by the inventors themselves (Jaffe, Fogarty, and Trajtenberg 2000) and knowledgeable peers in the technology domain (Albert et al., 1991) .
We use the number of citations received in a 5-year window after the filing date as a new dependent variable in our matching analysis. Consider, for instance, case 1: if we now find that the patents of nationally subsidized firms actually receive lesser citations than in the counterfactual situation of getting no subsidies, it would mean that firms may simply file patents for complying with the advice of the funding agency concerning the utilization of research results without actually displaying superior technological developments to other R&D projects. If, however, we find that these patents receive more citations, on average, we can conclude that firms are not only more likely to apply for patents in the future, but actually created valuable technology within the funded research projects that otherwise may not have existed.
The results of the citation analysis for our complete set of cases are presented in Table 7 . Although not every finding of the patent dummy analysis is confirmed (see cases 2 and 7 in the previous table), we find evidence that subsidies lead to superior technology developments as shown by received forward citations (cases 1, 3 and 10). We thus conclude that the findings for the patent dummy are not just an indication that firms comply with the public agencies' guidelines, but that they indeed develop valuable technology. 19
Conclusions
This paper analyzes the impact of different types of subsidies on input and output. We extend previous studies by evaluating what the impact of national versus, or in combination with, European subsidies are on our outcome variables.
In order to evaluate the impact of the current policy mix, we employ caliper matching to firm-level data from Germany to account for a potential selection bias. We find that both EU grants and national grants, as well as the combination of both, lead to higher innovation input in the economy when compared with a situation where these policies would be absent, that is, the counterfactual situation where the recipient firms would not be funded. Full crowdingout can therefore be rejected for both types of grants. In addition, we do not find evidence that one policy is crowding-out the effect of the other as recipients that obtain funding from both sources always invest more into innovation and R&D than in the counterfactual Lechner's (1999) asymptotic approximation correcting for replicated observations due to sampling with replacement. Cases 7 and 11 were matched using a caliper threshold and ln EMP (RDLAB for case 11) were used as additional matching criteria in order to properly balance treatment group and control group. 19 Given that the aim between both EU programs under review differ, we also performed the estimations on innovation performance separating Eastern from Western Germany. This separation allows reducing the bias from not having detailed information on both EU programs under scrutiny, given that is takes their main difference (the region's economic development) into account. The conclusions remain unchanged and detailed estimations can be obtained as supplemental material on the journal's website.
Innovation Subsidies 403 situation of just receiving funds from a single source. Based on the policy descriptions elaborated upon earlier in the paper, we can thus conclude that we do not find evidence that project management impacts the effect of the support received. With regard to innovation performance, we do not find that publicly funded firms are less productive. Keeping innovation investment constant allows us to indirectly conclude that the granted research projects have a similar productivity as purely privately funded projects. In terms of future patenting activity, we find that nationally funded firms (only national or in combination with EU funds) are more likely apply for patents in period t þ 1. A subsequent citation analysis further allows concluding that the patents filed by subsidized firms are more often referred to as relevant prior art. The filed patents therefore do not only reflect the compliance to the funding agency's rules. These findings are particularly interesting in light of the program management insofar that the selection process by the agencies does not reveal systematic differences. We know that for the German national support, each project gets evaluated by a technology-specific project-scheme management agency contracted by the federal government. At the EU level on the other hand, evaluation takes place at the broader, and therefore often less specialized level. Nonetheless, we do not find evidence pointing to the fact that EU-funded projects are less productive than the national or exclusively privately funded projects.
For future research, it would be useful to have access to more complete panel data, allowing for more time between innovation input and the potential innovation output in order to evaluate output beyond patents. We believe that our results on new product introduction remained somewhat inconclusive because of the cross-sectional nature of our data. Longer time-series would allow tracing innovation output over longer time periods. Furthermore, panel data would allow using panel estimation techniques that are not dependent on observables only, as is the case for the matching technique. Even though we have rich data, it cannot be ruled out that there are factors remaining unobserved to the researcher or the policy maker. Furthermore, it would be interesting to have more detailed information of the respective selection processes of national and European beneficiaries, allowing us to take the detailed selection process into account. In addition, it would be highly desirable to have information on the amount of funding at the firm level in future studies. The difference in treatment effects we identify in this paper may to some extent be confounded by heterogeneous grant amounts and not necessarily only a result of peculiar program characteristics. Finally, it should be noted that our findings are specific to Germany. It would be desirable to conduct similar analyses for other EU countries in order to see if analogous conclusions could be drawn. In addition, it would certainly be informative to compile data allowing a disaggregation of EU policies to permit for heterogeneity across different supranational schemes.
Supplementary data
Supplemental data for this article can be accessed at doi:10.1080/13662716.2014.973246. Tables 2 and 3 report Wald tests on overall significance of the probit regressions on the subsidy receipt after the matching has been performed. If the balancing of the samples with respect to the observed covariates was successful, we would expect the Wald test to be insignificant, as the model should no longer have any explanatory power in predicting the selection into the funding scheme. As no test statistic exceeds the critical value at the 5 per cent significance level, we conclude that our matching specification led well-balanced samples. Note: Cases 6, 8 and 9 have been dropped for further analysis as the control group size (118 observations) is not sufficient for a meaningful application of the matching estimator. a Some of the observations mentioned here are dropped because we require the matched controls to be located in the same industry, same region (Eastern/Western Germany) as well as be referring to the same year. Except for cases 2, 3, 4 and 12, a caliper threshold was used to avoid bad matches. For cases 7 and 11, ln EMP (RDLAB for case 10) were used as additional matching criteria in order to properly balance treatment group and control group. Note: Cases 6, 8 and 9 have been dropped for further analysis as the control group size (140 observations) is not sufficient for a meaningful application of the matching estimator. a Some of the observations mentioned here are dropped because we require the matched controls to be located in the same industry, same region (Eastern/Western Germany) as well as be referring to the same year. Cases 10 and 11
were matched using a caliper threshold to avoid bad matches and for case 11 ln AGE and ln EMP were used as additional matching criteria in order to properly balance treatment group and control group.
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